Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions

We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from some unknown distribution and construct an adaptive auction that is nevertheless value- andtime-strategy proof. For the k=1 problem we have a strategyproof variant on the classic secretary problem. We present a 4-competitive (e-competitive) strategyproof online algorithm with respect to offline Vickrey for revenue (efficiency). We also show (in a model that slightly generalizes the assumption of independent valuations) that no mechanism can be better than 3/2-competitive (2-competitive) for revenue (efficiency). Our general approach considers a learning phase followed by an accepting phase, and is careful to handle incentive issues for agents that span the two phases. We extend to the k›1 case, by deriving strategyproof mechanisms which are constant-competitive for revenue and efficiency. Finally, we present some strategyproof competitive algorithms for the case in which adversary uses a distribution known to the mechanism.Engineering and Applied Science

ABSTRACT Adaptive Limited-Supply Online Auctions

We study a limited-supply online auction problem, in which an auctioneer has k goods to sell and bidders arrive and depart dynamically. We suppose that agent valuations are drawn independently from some unknown distribution and construct an adaptive auction that is nevertheless value- and time-strategyproof. For the k = 1 problem we have a strategyproof variant on the classic secretary problem. We present a 4-competitive (e-competitive) strategyproof online algorithm with respect to offline Vickrey for revenue (efficiency). We also show (in a model that slightly generalizes the assumption of independent valuations) that no mechanism can be better than 3/2-competitive (2-competitive) for revenue (efficiency). Our general approach considers a learning phase followed by an accepting phase, and is careful to handle incentive issues for agents that span the two phases. We extend to the k> 1 case, by deriving strategyproof mechanisms which are constant-competitive for revenue and efficiency. Finally, we present some strategyproof competitive algorithms for the case in which adversary uses a distribution known to the mechanism

Oblivious network design

Consider the following network design problem: given a network G = (V, E), source-sink pairs {si, ti} arrive and desire to send a unit of flow between themselves. The cost of the routing is this: if edge e carries a total of fe flow (from all the terminal pairs), the cost is given by ∑ e ℓ(fe), where ℓ is some concave cost function; the goal is to minimize the total cost incurred. However, we want the routing to be oblivious: when terminal pair {si, ti} makes its routing decisions, it does not know the current flow on the edges of the network, nor the identity of the other pairs in the system. Moreover, it does not even know the identity of the function ℓ, merely knowing that ℓ is a concave function of the total flow on the edge. How should it (obliviously) route its one unit of flow